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Simitis’s Unsuccessful Struggle 
for Economic and Governmental 
Modernisation:
A Case of Irresolution or Impotence?
David Close
 Modernisation, meaning the attainment of best governmental practice in the Euro-
pean Union, was the mission of Kostas Simitis while prime minister in 1996–2004. 
In the goals which mattered most to himself and to voters — improving governmen-
tal effi  ciency so as to promote economic development and citizens’ welfare — his 
record was disappointing. Various international measures of Greece’s governmental 
and economic effi  ciency, and assessments of citizens’ satisfaction and government 
fi nances, indicate regression rather than progress. Th e basic cause of failure is argued 
to be the prevalence of traditional clientelist attitudes, which made the state very 
infl uential over society and the economy, while condemning it to ineffi  ciency. Gov-
ernment infl uence over the economy and labour force burdened them with restric-
tive practices. Yet few if any members of the major political parties accepted the full 
implications of modernisation. While meriting some blame, Simitis failed mainly 
because of factors beyond his control. 
Th e importance of the struggle, and evidence of its failure
Th roughout his eight years as prime minister (1996–2004), Kostas Simitis empha-
sised his aim of modernisation, in the sense of attaining the best governmental prac-
tice of the European Union (EU). Th e detailed implications of modernisation were 
contained in the directives and exhortations of the European Commission, the EU’s 
executive body. Broad goals appeared in the so-called Lisbon Strategy, adopted by 
EU governments in March 2000, and cited regularly by Simitis the re aft er. Th is aimed 
to make the Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world” by 2010, while progressing towards social cohesion and protection of the 
natural environment (Th e Economist, 11 May 2000, Internet edition, “Europe’s Last 
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Post?”). Th e ulti mate objective — implied in 
many speeches by Simitis — was to re form 
governmental pra ctices so as to promote the 
people’s welfare in its fullest sense. 
In choosing Simitis as prime mi n ister in 
January 1996, a majority of his par liamentary 
party, PASOK, opted con scious ly for a cham-
pion of modern isa tion according to the EU 
model. During his varied ministerial career 
since 1981, Simi tis had won a reputation for 
integrity and competence which appealed to 
diverse social groups, especially bu sines smen 
and the highly educated (Kathimerini, 14 
December 2003, K. P. Papadiochou, Eng lish 
Internet edition). While leading the party 
to victory in the general elections of Sep-
tember 1996 and March 2000, he appointed 
like-minded colleagues to key ministries. 
Aft er his acclaimed achievement of bring-
ing Greece into the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU, the euro-zone of twelve EU countries) in June 2000, he preached mod-
ernisation with even greater fervour and authority. 
But, by the time of his defeat in the parliamentary election of March 2004, he 
had fallen far short of his aims in the aspect of modernisation which mattered 
most to himself and to the electorate: improving the effi  ciency of the ramshackle 
state machine (comprising state enterprises and the public administration) so as 
to promote economic development and provide better services. Th is paper will 
assess the reasons for Simitis’s failure, from the vantage-point of December 2005. 
It diff ers in approach from a collection of essays by fi ve academics just published 
in Greece (Pelagides, 2005), and 13 articles just published in a special issue of West 
European Politics (Featherstone, 2005). It does not challenge the conclusions of 
these works, but benefi ts from a study of developments which occurred aft er they 
were written.
Reports from diverse bodies show Simitis’s failure. Th e Centre for Planning 
and Economic Research (KEPE) reported in May 2005 that “despite reforming ini-
tiatives, the modernization and improvement of the state’s organizing sectors have 
not materialized” and their “management methods and processes remain obsolete” 
(Kathimerini, 26 May 2005, Nikos Nikolaou, English Internet edition). In progress 
towards implementing the Lisbon Strategy, and in general economic competitiveness, 
successive surveys placed Greece successively lower in the international scale, and 
usually at the bottom of the European Union of 15 countries (EU–15, before the 
accession of ten more countries in May 2004). For example, in the World Com-
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petitiveness Yearbook of 60 countries, compiled by the International Institute 
for Management Development, Greece fell, between 2000 and 2005, from 49th to 
52nd place in government effi  ciency, and from 39th to 49th in business effi  ciency 
(Kathimerini, 12 May 2005, English Internet edition). As a proportion of GDP, state 
investment in research and development, and in education generally, stagnated 
during the Simitis years at levels which were the lowest in the EU–15. According 
to a well-informed reporter for the authoritative daily, Kathimerini, Simitis de-
veloped no public policy for fi nancing research and development (Kathimerini, 6 
March 2004, Apostolou Lakasa, Greek Internet edition). His governments must 
therefore share the blame for the fact that the economy remained technologically 
backward by all conventional criteria. In innovation, according to the European 
Commission defi nition, it rated 23rd in the EU–25 in 2005 (Kathimerini, 13 Janu-
ary 2006, editorial, referring to the European Innovation Scoreboard for 2005; 
To Vima, 12 February 2006:B10, D. Asimakopoulou). A study by the European 
Central Bank, in 2003, of the productivity of the public sector estimated that the 
government could cut expenditure by 39% by using resources more effi  ciently. 
Annual assessments of the honesty of politicians and public offi  cials by Transpar-
ency International placed Greece 49th out of 146 countries in 2004. Authoritative 
commentators like the Confederation of Greek Industries considered offi  cial cor-
ruption a major obstacle to investment, especially to foreigners unfamiliar with 
Greek bureaucracy (Kathimerini, 18 September 2003, Greek Internet edition; To 
Vima, 18 May 2003:A16, Nikos Nikolaou; Transparency International website). 
Th e balance of visible trade worsened, especially with western Europe. Exports to 
all countries had been 45% of the value of imports in 1995; but were below 30% 
in 2005. Especially damaging evidence of failure was the revelation, aft er Simitis’s 
retirement, that admission to the EMU had been achieved through fraudulent es-
timates by the National Statistical Service of the public debt and successive budget 
defi cits. Greece, it turns out, never qualifi ed for membership of the EMU. It now 
appears that the Greek public debt was the highest in the EU–15; while — what is 
worse — successive governments had failed since 1993 to reduce it signifi cantly, 
despite conditions possibly more favourable to debt reduction than in any other 
EU country. 
Th e government made strenuous eff orts to improve services to citizens; but 
without much impression on the electorate. An opinion poll of December 2002, 
asking citizens “how did conditions for our country change in 2002?” showed that 
in most areas which mattered to voters, the great majority reacted negatively, say-
ing in roughly equal proportions that the following had remained unchanged or 
worsened: educational and health services, offi  cial corruption, measures against 
unemployment, service by public offi  cials, and measures against crime. Only with 
regard to major construction projects did voters consider that there had been 
improvement (To Vima, 22 December 2002:A5, G. Lakopoulou).
While it must be admitted that in several of the areas dealt with in this paper, 
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some progress was made under Simitis, the question to be answered is why it was 
so limited. 
Clientelism as a cause of ineffi  ciency
Th e fatal obstacle to Simitis’s policies has been recognised by historians and politi-
cal scientists as a traditional and ubiquitous feature of the Greek political system. 
What is interesting is that it remains prevalent, despite the support for modernisa-
tion by the major parties. Th is feature is clientelism, which can be defi ned as the 
use by politicians or public servants of public offi  ce in order to bestow favours on 
identifi able individuals or groups of people. Since early in the history of the mod-
ern state, the practice has been dominated by political parties. It will be argued, 
fi rstly, that Simitis and his modernising colleagues had limited power to remedy 
this practice, and, secondly, that — because they were its creatures — they were 
half-hearted in their attempts to do so. Simitis spoke more truly than he realised 
when he said, in December 2000, that the attainment of EU norms demanded “a 
change of mentality and culture” on everyone’s part (Athens News, 6 December 
2000, Internet edition).
Th e ubiquity of clientelism is shown by the structure of the public administra-
tion, which has been distorted by the patronage requirements of politicians. One 
distortion is its extensive infl uence over society and economy, and another is its 
size. Both are grossly excessive in relation to whatever benefi ts governments pro-
vide to the public. It is largely because they must spend so much on paying super-
fl uous employees and subsidising over-staff ed state enterprises that successive 
governments have failed to curb budget defi cits. Th e dysfunctional structure of the 
public administration — with its top-heaviness, irrational division of responsibili-
ties between ministries, and ineffi  cient allocation of personnel — shows again how 
the requirements of patronage took precedence over those of effi  ciency. Driven 
by clientelist needs, the development of the public administration has been dis-
organised, so that ministers cannot control it or use it as an instrument of policy. 
Disorganisation, and low ethical standards, prevent public servants from control-
ling costs, especially in big-spending sectors such as those responsible for health 
services, defence procurements and construction projects (To Vima, 4 May 2003:
B4, Nikos Nikolaou).
Another distortion is that decision-making machinery is over-centralised, 
because senior fi gures like to retain the power to bestow or deny favours. Th us the 
offi  ces of some PASOK ministers were reported in 2003 to be clogged with stacks of 
routine requests overdue for answers (Ta Nea, 28 May 2003:6). Offi  cials at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy are restricted to applying the rules; but even they can expedite 
favoured requests and impede others, especially because many of the rules are 
confused. At this level, there is ample scope for bribery. Service to the public ranks 
notoriously low among public servants’ priorities; and their habitual dilatoriness 
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forces citizens to waste much time in government offi  ces (Kathimerini, 29 April 
2005, letter by Les Grove, English Internet edition). A recent survey by Professor 
Antonis Makrydimitris, who was advising the government on reform of the public 
administration, found that half the population had to visit a government offi  ce at 
least once a month, and another 20% at least twice every six months (Kathimerini, 
15 April 2004, English Internet edition).
Appointments to public offi  ce, at the national and local level, were in the past 
most eagerly sought by those with poor educational qualifi cations, who had lit-
tle other prospect of a secure, white-collar job. Such people have now risen to 
senior ranks. Recruitment to the public administration is, to this day, normally 
spoken of by politicians and journalists as a form of unemployment relief, with 
preference still being given to disadvantaged people such as the unemployed, or 
parents of large families. Th e consequence of such criteria for appointments is a 
generally low level of morale and competence. A survey of 1997 found over half 
of public servants admitting that they lacked relevant qualifi cations. Even now, 
applicants are not required to be computer-literate (To Vima, 30 March 1997:
A49, D. Nikolopoulou; Kathimerini, 13 February 2005, Greek Internet edition). 
Th e shortage of skills is particularly true of strategic policy formulation, and the 
implementation of major reforms. Th e role that in northern European countries 
is fi lled by professional public servants has to be fi lled in Greece by politicians 
and their numerous advisers, many of whom are academics. Important areas of 
government policy cannot be implemented because qualifi ed staff  are unavail-
able: an example which has been prominent for some years has been the loss 
of massive EU subsidies through failure to frame applications that comply with 
EU requirements, and through misuse of the funds when granted. In these tests 
of bureaucratic competence, Greece has, once again, scored worst in the EU–15 
(Kathimerini, 10 December 2005, editorial, “Making Use of EU Money”, English 
Internet edition). In 2003, the European Commission asked why the Greek gov-
ernment was using methods for costing construction projects which had “for long 
proved ineff ective”, when methods generally used in other countries were avail-
able on CD-ROM. Th e Commission also noted the serious defi ciencies in qual-
ity-control of public works: a defect which became obvious at this time in the 
subsidence of long stretches of new highway and the collapse of at least one new 
bridge (Kathimerini, 14 November 2003, Fotis Kollias, English Internet edition). 
Th e previous year, a European Commissioner noted that an obstacle to planning 
and implementation of programmes was that “in Greece, the clientelist system is 
universally prevalent”, and expressed irritation at being subjected while in Athens 
to pressure for favours from politicians and their relatives (To Vima, 26 May 2002:
B6, M. Spinthouraki).
Public servants are extremely slow to learn new skills or respond to new needs. 
For example, the ministries have still failed to network their separate websites; 
while IKA, the main social insurance institution, has taken many years to com-
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puterise its records. Various departments have proved unable to undertake new 
responsibilities, even when action has been urgently demanded by the European 
Commission or by Greek voters. Examples are the processing of toxic waste, the 
recycling of garbage, the treatment of urban sewage, and the protection of wildlife 
(Kathimerini, 13 April 2005, English Internet edition; Athens News, 1 April 2005, 
Cordelia Madden).
As in many other countries, legal barriers to politicians’ pressure on public offi  -
cials have been erected, the main one being guaranteed lifelong tenure of offi  ce. In 
Greece the barriers had to be raised especially high, with the result that there are 
now few ways for ministers to reward effi  ciency, penalise incompetence, or compel 
action. Th us public servants can and do thwart pressure from their political mas-
ters, as well as the public. 
Nevertheless, successive governments, driven by exasperated voters, have in 
recent years fought against some of the most vexatious problems. One famous 
example is Simitis’s child, the pioneering institution known as the Citizen’s Advo-
cate (or Ombudsman), which has since late 1998 received complaints at a rate far 
above the average in other EU countries, and dealt successfully with several thou-
sand of them each year. Its recommendations for reform have been sympatheti-
cally received by ministers; and its constant mediation between citizens and public 
offi  cials is presumably infl uencing the latter’s behaviour (To Vima, 20 February 
2000:A55, D. Nikolakopoulou; Kathimerini, 13 September 2005, English Internet 
edition). Another example is the proliferation since 2000 of Centres for the Service 
of Citizens, in order to provide without trouble to the applicant any one of hun-
dreds of diff erent documents or licences, each of which had until then required a 
long, slow tour of dispersed offi  ces. By 2004, there seems to have been one in every 
municipality; but most were too under-staff ed to be eff ective. Moreover, public offi  -
cials were habitually obstructing the Centres, because they would not off er bribes 
(Kathimerini, 10 September 2004, Foteini Kalliri, Greek Internet edition; Ta Nea, 
27 October 2004, Nikoletta Moutousi, Greek Internet edition). Evidently time was 
needed to increase the Centres’ staff  and authority, because a recent opinon poll 
shows that nearly everyone now approves of them (Kathimerini, 1 December 2005, 
Foteini Kalliri, Greek Internet edition). 
Clientelism and the economy
Among the clientelist practices of politicians, over many decades, has been the 
bestowal of economic privileges on favoured occupation groups, businesses, and 
trade unions. As a consequence, market forces are seriously constrained by restric-
tive practices, which, according to a report by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2001, now constitute the main weak-
ness of the Greek economy, burdening most of its branches (Kathimerini, 3 June 
2001, Gianni Kotofolou, Greek Internet edition). Th e European Commission agreed 
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in a report of 2003 that the Greek economy was the most “closed” in the EU 
(Athens News, 15 October 2004, Robert McDonald, Internet edition). Examples 
of such restrictions are: the ability of many professions and occupation-groups 
to determine their own remuneration, or restrict recruitment, or create an artifi -
cial demand for their services; the open or tacit cartels in important branches of 
industry and commerce; the monopolistic or near-monopolistic power of many 
state-controlled economic enterprises; the restrictions on employers’ power to dis-
miss staff  and vary their employees’ pay and working-hours, in accordance with 
changing economic needs. Th ese restrictions provide the most obvious explanation 
for the comparatively high rates of infl ation and unemployment in recent years, 
both outstanding causes of public discontent. From 1992 onwards, the European 
Commission struggled to make reluctant Greek governments introduce competi-
tion in transport, telecommunications and energy supply. Simitis’s governments 
complied, belatedly and partially, in transport and telecommunications. But they 
failed — alone among EU states — to transpose into domestic law an EU directive 
aiming to create an open market for electricity supply. Th e following government 
was in July 2005 referred to the European Court of Justice for the same omission 
(Kathimerini, 7 July 2005, English Internet edition). 
As politicians everywhere know, it is extraordinarily diffi  cult to revoke what 
voters regard as entitlements. So the Simitis government found, when it tried to 
liberalise the economy. Its attempt to deregulate relations between employers and 
employees provoked a general strike in October 2000, aft er which it confi ned itself 
to very limited reforms to a labour market that remained exceptionally rigid by 
EU standards (Athens News, 17 May 2003, Mark Dragoumis, Internet edition). Its 
attempt to abolish the privileges of about 80 occupation-groups and professions 
met with almost complete defeat in 2001, aft er repeated strikes (Ta Nea, 9 Novem-
ber 2002, Eirini Chrysolora, Greek Internet edition). Underlying these defeats is 
lack of public support for reform, deriving from a general assumption that it is the 
government’s duty to protect people’s livelihoods (Kathimerini, 2 April 2002, quoted 
by H. A. Papadimitriou, English Internet edition). 
Another governmental failure was the slow and limited degree (by comparison 
with other southern EU countries) to which state-owned enterprises were pri-
vatised and exposed to competition (Wright and Pagoulatos, 2001:265–66). Th e 
approach by governments to most larger enterprises was to sell shares in them to 
private investors, leaving the staff  with the privileged status of public servants and 
the government owning enough shares to control the appointment of executives. 
Th e delay in liberalising the economy was remarkable because it was obvious that 
to do so would greatly benefi t the public. Th is was demonstrated for example in 
telecommunications, airlines, marine ferries and bank interest rates. 
Why then was liberalisation so slow? Clientelist relationships again provide the 
answer. Complete privatisation was seen by those employed in the state enterprises 
as a threat to their job security and privileged incomes. Public sector employees 
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were powerful because they all belonged to trade unions, which were dominated 
by factions linked to the parties. Another related obstacle to liberalisation was 
the ruling party’s reluctance to lose patronage. Th e increasing decentralisation of 
functions to municipalities in the last ten years created a further obstacle, because 
municipal councillors also wanted the patronage obtained by control over services 
(To Vima, 4 February 2001:A12, Giorgos A. Bitrou). Meanwhile, governments con-
tinued to pay for the public enterprises’ debts, while failing to control their prices 
or their borrowing, so that the defi cits of the 29 enterprises not listed on the stock 
exchange rose steeply in 2000–2004. Many or most enterprises failed to provide 
good service (To Vima, 28 July 2002:B2, Nikos Nikolaou; To Vima, 24 October 2004:
B2, Nikos Nikolaou, citing a report by the Governor of the Bank of Greece; Kathi-
merini, 18 December 2005, Nikos Nikolaou, Greek Internet edition).
Until recently, private cartels were not seriously challenged by the Competition 
Commission established in 1977. Its weakness suited the most powerful pressure-
groups for employers and employees respectively — the Confederation of Greek 
Industries and the General Confederation of Greek Workers — both of which 
were routinely consulted about the appointment of its members. As in other ways, 
the government was incapable of challenging powerful interest groups, especially 
those like the latter which had organised sympathisers within the ruling party. Th is 
is a traditional weakness of Greek governments which appears to be due, fi rstly, to 
the prevalence of clientelist attitudes, and, secondly, to citizens’ disrespect for the 
state, making them reluctant to support governments in confrontations with inter-
est-groups. 
Another type of restrictive practice was the red tape obstructing any entre-
preneur who tried to establish a new business. Politicians, economic analysts and 
businessmen frequently complained about the multitude of permits which entre-
preneurs had to obtain from diverse branches of national and local government, 
which were slow to provide them. In 2004, a World Bank report placed Greece 
among the worst (125th) of 132 countries in this respect. (Kathimerini, 25 February 
2004, Christos Staikouras, English Internet edition). To judge by the continuance 
of complaints, successive governments had little or no success in remedying the 
problem, so illustrating their lack of control over bureaucracy. 
In important ways, recent governments continued to grant economic favours. 
Th e award of government contracts remained notoriously corrupt, in the sense 
of being infl uenced by bribery or favouritism. Th e journalist Nikos Nikolaou, 
for example, referred in December 2004 to the standard government practice of 
favouring certain suppliers at the expense of others, regardless of their effi  ciency 
(To Vima, 19 December 2004:B2). Th e availability from the 1980s of vast EU sub-
sidies for physi cal and administrative infrastructure increased governments’ scope 
for such patronage. 
Conclusion
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It is now time to address the question in the title: irresolution or impotence? Th e 
answer implied by this article is both, but more of the latter. Th e role of the former 
was demonstrated before the March 2004 election, when both major parties in-
dulged in an orgy of old-fashioned rousfetoloyia (promises of jobs or favours)— 
so contradicting their simultaneous promises of more effi  cient government. It is 
evident that few if any people in either party accepted the full implications of 
modernisation. Not even Simitis did so: for example he failed to question the 
National Statistical Service’s estimates of the budget defi cit and public debt, while 
their unreliability was being publicly discussed over some years. Moreover, he 
was criticised by shrewd commentators for weakness and timidity in managing 
his governments (Th e Economist, 15 April 2000:56; To Vima, 4 January 2004:B2, 
Nikos Nikolaou). But the facts presented in this article show that his aspirations 
were thwarted mainly by factors beyond his control: the weaknesses of the public 
administration, the demands of his party machine, and the ambivalent attitude 
to modernisation of most voters. Further evidence for this conclusion now lies 
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